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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
~'/'.\TE IW l·T.\11, h:•; and through 
1t~ lfoad ( '0111111i~~ion, 
Plai11tiff and appellant, 
VI'. 
\l·T:ll .\~ l'. PETTY and IRI£\TA G. 
l'Kl'TY, hi~ "·ife, 
JJetcildr111fs aud respondents. 
BHIEl'' OF RESPONDENTS 
Case No. 
10354 
Thi:-: i:-: an inh,•rloeuton· appeal by the State of Utah 
h~· and th mug-Ji its Hoad Commission from an order of 
r·ourt. ~lan·("lln:-: K. Snow, .Tudge of the Third Judicial 
2 
District Court, Salt Lak0 County Stak of l "t l . . . . ' at, tt>4n11. 
mg the appellant to am;W('l" certain intPt'f(Jg t : . . a 1111>" 
subnntted to n'spondents lwrein and awai·d1·11 1 ' . . g Ii 11 
spondents tlw sum of $75.00 attornpy's ft>es •·01: f' ·1 • ' 1 a1 Ul'e 
to answer said interrogatoriPs timPly. 
DISPOSITION JN LOWER conn 
The appellant filed a complaint in condemnation t11 
acquire on behalf of the State of 1ltah certain propPrtiP> 
in Salt Lake County. The proceedings were separateli 
for purposes of litigating values of the separate pawls 
of land. Respondents herein filed an answer to plaintiff\ · 
complaint after which interrogatories were Sl'rwd h: 
both appellant an<l respondents. Respondents' interroga-
tories were served on December 2-1:, 196-1:, by mail, and 
answers to the same were filed on :March 1, 1965. ObjPC· '. 
tions to the same were filed by respondents on .March~. 
1965, together with a motion to compel answers and for 
an award of the court of attorney's fees for the brin~ng 
of the motion. Said motion was noticed for hearing on 
March 29, 1965, at which time appellant was ordered to 
answer the interrogatories propounded by respondenti 
and respondents were awarded $75.00 attorney's fees for 
bringing said motion. 
From said order of the court, an interlocutory ap· · 
peal was taken hy appellant. 
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Ht>:-:pond1·nb s<•Pk to uphold the trial court's order 
1·1>1llJll'llillµ: app<·llant to answPr said interrogatories and 
lllil]()l<linp: ti\(' trial C'ourt's grant of attorney's fees. 
~'L\TE~II~XT OF FACTS 
Ht>:-:pond<•nts ac-qni<>sce to the statement of facts set 
fnrtl1 in apJH•llanfs hriPf, \Yith the further statement that 
;lw onl.\ rnatt·rial int<·rrogatories to this appeal are in-
t1·rroµ:atori1•s nmnlwrPd 3 and -1-, submitted and set forth 
nrhatilll in ap1wllant's hrief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ORDERING THE 
APPELLANT TO ANSWER INTERROGATORIES PRO-
POUNDED TO IT. 
In replying to appellant's hrief on the principal issue 
in this C'asP, rPspondents direct the court's attention to 
1 lti' OnlPr ( H. :H and 35) in this case entered by the trial 
.indpy in tltP court lwlow; particularly the wording of the 
orclpr is iwrtinent to this appeal in that the court in 
making thP sa11w rnakPs the following findings in support 
tl1Prpof: 
1. DPf Pnclants' PPtty served upon plaintiff by 
mail on DPcernher :23, 196-1, certain interrogatories 
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pertinent to th<> issnPs iwrtainin<r to JlaJ'('(•l f''f't 
• h c I 1•1>11 
m the ahov<' <'aptiorn•d rasP. 
2 .. Plaintiff h~· an? though <·ouns<>l KPnnPth JI 
H1satake n•pr<>s<>ntmg tlw offieP of thP attr
1
rn1,,: 
w·neral, answ<>red said interrogatories In- mail 1,;1 February 2-1-, 19G5. · 
3. There "·as no rontest as to thP failure on ;11 .. 
part of th<>sP defendants to afford plaintiff addi-
tional timP to answer thP suhjPet 111attr>r int1·r-
rogatories. 
4. No ohj<>rtions as to the form or rontent' of 
these defendants' interrogatories wne filed within 
ten days from the date of servire as requirPd by 
Rule 37 of tlw Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
5. Plaintiff waived any objections to d~:'fendant~' 
interrogatories by failure to object to the same 
timely. 
6. These defendants \H're required to bring tlw 
subject mattPr motion before the court in order 
to compell plaintiff to answer fully and eomplet.Pl)' 
the interrogatories heretofore propounded bem~ 
the subject matter of this order. 
7. These defendants are entitled to have said 
interrogatories answered and are entitled to 
an award of this court for attorney's fees for the 
bringing of this motion. 
Now here in tlw record is it revt>aled that the findings of 
the court in support of ih; order arf' erronPons, and thm-
fore those findino·s must be tahn as true and accuratf 
' 0 
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,1,.: th<' ~·ill<lings of tlw trial judge. In appellant's brief, 
1·n11111w1wing at page 1:2 and on pages 13 and 14, two 
frrleral casPs interin·eting tlw FPderal Rules of Civil 
1>rnePdnn· an-- dis(·nssP<l in detail (Boldin v. Brass Rail, 
/111 .. :20 Ft>d :22-1-, SDNY 1957, Baxter v. Vick, 25 FRD 
llD. ED Pa. 19GO). These cases are conceded by respond-
P!lb as hPing fairl~, summarized in appellant's brief. 
Be,.:pondt>nts do not evPn take issue with these cases as 
µ:r1wrally sm·('PPding f edPral district cases have followed 
thf· Bolilin rt>asoning, most of these cases arise out of the 
north(_•astern portion of the United States. However, it 
,.:hnuld lw pointPd out that Rule 30(b ), Utah Rules of Civil 
Pnwedurf', is not identical with the similar federal rule 
\rhich giYPs the trial court an opportunity to make a 
dPh·n11ination a1-; to good cause for refusal to answer 
nr thP TIPPd for an order compelling answers when the 
qtwstion of privih•ge or attorney's work product is raised. 
T!te general import of our Rule 30(b) and its protective 
prn1wnsitiPs doPs not follow the Federal Rule. The very 
naturp of tlw interrogatories propounded by respondents 
to ap1w1lant nowlwre requests appellant to produce for 
inspPdion or state in verbatim the essence of any writing 
as sueh. On the contrary, respondents have asked only 
fnr thP conelusions of these experts without asking for 
thP appraisal reports themselves. 
In f" 11iferl States of America r. 23.76 Acres of Land 
and r-11iterl ,'-i'tates of Amrrica v. 27.68 Acres of Land, 
r>te., :t2 FRD 59~ at 59-1-, the District Court of Maryland 
llPYiatPd from thP Bohlin supra rule and stated in 
' ' 
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response to the following oral int<>nogatory: 
"\Vhat did YOU considPr thP hicrl1<·st an(!] 
a h • jf•\+ 
use of the property'?" ' 
at page 596 stated: 
. "~r~m the very naturP of the qlwstions e]i('if. 
mg op1mons sought to be answPred, there is 111! 
basis to b<'lievP that the information sought to he 
elicited, Rine<' it is subjective in nature, mig-ht bt 
obtained by tlw defrndant except hy thP qm•stinn• 
being answered by the only 1wrson, the rxpert, 
who has sueh information. It is to be noted in thi~ 
regard that onP of the Pxpress USPS of thr drpo~i­
tions is that of cross-examination, Rule 2G(d)ill, 
and it needs no citation of authority to sa~· that 
an expert is the most difficult witness to eros~­
examine, particularly if one is unaware until trial, 
of the substance of his testimony." 
The court further stated in the foregoing case after 
considering Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. -195, 67 Sup. Ct. · 
385, 91 L Ed 2d 451, and numerous cases and citations, 
at page 597: 
"By the more modern and better-reaso~ed 
cases discovery in this area if denied, is dem(l(l ' . ' . ' on the grounds of unfairness." (The qurst10n o, 
unfairness is triable as part of Federal Rnk 
30(b ).) 
. · · . ' F deral The judge cited for tlus propos1t10n -1 -:\Ioore s e 
Practice ( 1962 Ed.), paragraph 26.2-1, page 1523, ano 
then held at page 597 : 
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.. ,\ ft<'r suit hm; hPgun ... it is also true that 
t!H· sol<' isslH' for thP jury and, in the vast majority 
of eases, th<' solP issuP in the ease, is one of just 
<'Olll]H'nsation. ~WhilP it is convenient fiction that 
t Jip propt>rt~· O\\'DPr knows thP value of his o\vn 
i1rop<>rty, in most casc>s the statement is pure fie 
tion and in a easP such as thP onp at bar, where 
int<·r('sts less than a f pe intPrest are taken, as well 
as an intPrPst in f PP, and where quantitatively 
portions of largPr tracts are taken so that there i$ 
good ground to suspect that there may be sever 
anc·<· damagPs, the litigation becomes a battle of 
experts." 
.Ancl furthPr eited Hickman v. Taylor, supra, again 
for the following statement: 
.. ~f utnal knowledgP of all the relevant fact~ 
gathPrPd h~· hoth parties is essential to prope1 
litigation .... The deposition discovery procedure 
simply advancc>s tlw stage at which the disclosun 
can he com1wlled from the time of trial to the 
pPriod precPding it, thus reducing the possibility 
of surprise.'' 
Based on the forpgoing considerations, and Mary 
land f-ltate law, tlw District Court of Maryland ordered 
the Px1wrt witnPs::; to answPr the questions propounded to 
liim in thP dPposition without adhering to Bohlin: 
(supra). 
In thP ea~w of Oceanside ['nion School District, San 
!Jieqo Co111d,11 r. ,"'i'11perior Court of San Diego County, 
Ji;) P.:2d -189, a n<>arly identical question to the one on 
8 
ap1wal wa:,; prPs<'ntf•<l. Tn prq>arntio11 for tfrll l f 
1 •• ' < P f'llr an 
filed and served npon pt>tition<>r e<·rtain intPri·oirat : 
I' 111 Jp, 
ea1ling for tlw na11ws and addr<>:,;ses of Paeh ll"r .
0 1 
· 
' ' ~ TI\\" I• 
had rendPred to plaintiff an opinion as to tit .. rnnr!:i; 
value of the S<'VPra1:ee darnagPs to <>a<'h irnliYidnal 11 j,.1" 
of property ownPd hy defendant:,;, tog<'tlH•r with thPil 
opinion, and tlw an·a eontained in <>a('h pare<>l. Xo r" 
quest was made for thP rq)()rts of th<· appraisPr~. tlwrl'ln 
ereating the idPntical fact situation a::-: in the i11~taii1 
appeal. Likewist>, th<> California court ]ward an irl1,lltll'a: 
argumPnt iwrtaining to the apprai~wrs' rrports lwi11~ 
prepared in antieipation of litigation. The eourt Hat:·~ 
at page 443: 
"\Yhile it is true that tlw petitionrr mi~h\ 
gain a taetieal advantag<' at tlw trial if their ad 
versari<>s are n--quir<>d ~to come into C'ourt "·ithou! 
knowlPdgP of tlw appraisNs' valuation of their 
property, such an advantage is not to br equatPd 
with 'puhlic justice'. The imqws<> of tht> r~n­
demnation action (out of which this proceedin~ 
has arisen) is to detern1int> tlw fair market :alue 
of the propPrty. Assuuwdly, pl'titione~ behm> 
that its appraisers havP arriwd at a fair mar~et 
value. If public interest ... would suffrr by dis-
closure of tlw fair markd value of tlw condPmnt'I: 
· ·1 · Id ha'"' property, thPn the statute of pnv1 ege "on · 
to fall hefon• the constitutional n•quirrrnents that 
k · tl t due 1irorefi no privatt> property he ta Pn w1 iou 
of law." 
. . . , concerned 
The case em-rently under d1scuf':-;10n 18 · . 
. • · lRRl f the Cah-
\\'ith intPrpn~·ting a portwn of Seetwn ' c 0 
---
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fOl'nia ( 'iyil ( '()(l<· c·ovnmg <'OnfidPntial communications 
11 Jiid1 n·a<l~: 
",\ pnlili<' offi<'<•r <·annot hP examined as to 
<·0111111m1iC'ati 1m mac1<' to him in official confidence, 
11 liPn th<' puhlie intPn·st would suffer hy its dis-
do:;nn·." 
.\n•l \\ hi1·h i:-; allllo;,;t wrhati111 with 7~-2-1--8(5) rCA 1953, 
;i])ll n•:-;poJl(l<·nt:; sulnuit that in essence, California has 
:1th·11111t<·<1 to <'OY<'I' th<• ;-;ame point in its civil code as 
1 ·tali has att<·rnptP<l to eovPr in its code of civil procedure. 
Tiu• California eourt furthPr, in considering various 
r0tli 0 ·r argm11Pnt;-; propounded in the case, included the 
11r;.tlllt1Pnt of attorney-elient privilege. The California 
rnlP is P:O:sPntiall:· tlw sm1w as ours (UCA, 78-24-8(2) ). 
l IP1«· th<• <"ourt notPd that appraiser's reports were sub-
lllittP<l liy appraisPrs who were retained for the purpose 
r>i' antieipat<·d litigation \\·ith the specific intent that their 
n·ports would ht> de liverPd to the school district attorney 
in confid<·nc·P. On this point the court held, 
•·. . . the rPal question involved is whether 
th<· infon11ation gathered, and the opinions formed 
hy an <'~pPrt rdained to prf'vare himself for giv-
ing t<';,;tirnony, ronstitute ~rnch a communication . 
. \:- point<·d out in tlu• Suezaki opinion, (Suezaki 
r. S111J1·rior ('011rt, ~73 P2d 432) there are cer-
tainly sn111<· instanees where the expert's report 
dews <'Onstitnt<• a "('ommunication' from attorney 
to dirnt. ~n<'h is tnw where the expert is required 
to <>xarninP the elient, his personal affairs or his 
10 
property, or his nwntal im1)n'ssions i·n l 
1 
. ' ' ' ore Pr t11 
eva uate and transmit the sa111e in a iiia . 
h . h t} l" . llllPr Ill w IC le c ient is unable hY r<'ason of 1·n · ff' · . . . • SU H'!Pn' 
scientific or technical training. But wh '. 
h th 
. f . er\'. a, 
ere, e m orrnahon that th\' ex1wrt i";;: J1i·1 ·1 • , ~ "('( \11 
assess (and on _which he rPports) clops not Plllan. 
ate from the chent, but from his adversan- ti t 
t t b "d b ' . ' la repor canno e sa1 to ea corn111unication' froni 
client to attorney as that phrase is used in th 
statute creating privilege. Logically, it cannot 1i: 
held that material (including factual data anrl 
opinion) is privileged merely because it is the 
result of an expert's mental calculations and 1ra-
delivered to the attorney in confidence, in casP~ 
where the information on which it is predicatl'd 
cannot be shown to have emanated from that at. 
torney's client." (Oceanside, supra, page +4) 
For the foregoing proposition, the California court 
cited Friendenthal, Discovery and ['se of An Adrersf 
Party's Expert Information, (1962) l± Stan. L.Rev. +55. 
in which the author stated: 
" ( w) ithout special justification, conununica 
tions of an expert ought not to he protected any 
more than communications of any other agent." 
After citing People ex rel. Department of Public 
Works v. Donovan, 369 P2d 1, the California court con 
eluded that the attorney-client privilege does not protect 
the facts or mental opinions or calculations of that type 
· d not of expert who, like the real estate appraiser, oes 
. f t. ·h. h emanated 
pass on to the attorney any m orma 10n " ic 
"from the client". The court concluded that: 
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"Th(• distinetion is has(:'d on the source of the 
l':\fH•rt's information, ratlwr than on any intent 
or la<·k of intPnt to rnak(:' the communication con-
fidPntial. . . . 1f the expert is not transmitting 
tl1<> <"li"nts <"onfidPncPs, his communication cannot 
lw prnb·ct<>d hy the provisions of the statute. 
[ ~\nalagons to our rulP 30(b) Ftah Rules Civil 
Proe<>dnr<'] Tlw sol(:' purpOS(:' of which is to en-
eonrag<' a eliPnt to make full disclosure to his 
attorn<•y without foar that others may be in-
fomwd." ( Oeeanside supra, page 445) 
Tlw elaim of privilegP b~- virtue of work product of 
an attornp~- is found in 4 Moore's Federal Practice, Sec-
u/111 Erlitirill, para. :2fi2.+, 19()2 Suppl., page 1528, is found: 
'"The SuprPnw court decision in Hickman v. 
Taylor (:mpra) makPs it difficult to sustain the 
argmw·nt that opinions of an expert, although 
proeurPd h~- counsel, are within the attorney-client 
vrivilPge. "'hilP the narrow question before the 
court was the right to obtain discovery of state 
rnents of ordinary witnesses, the court used broad 
language in disposing of the issue of privilege: 
(quoting from page 392) ' ... the protective cloak 
of this privilege does not extend to information 
which an attorney secures from a witness whilE 
acting for his client in anticipation of litigation 
X or does this privil(:'ge concern the memoranda~ 
briefs, communications and other writings pre-
1ian•d hv coum;el for his own use in prosecuting 
his <'li(:'nt's ease; and it is equally unrelated to 
writings which rPflect an attorney's mental im 
J1 r e s s i o n s , conclusions, opinions and legal 
thE:>ories.' " 
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.Moore further statt>s : 
"If lllt>nrnranda }H'<>parPd hv eonnsrl 1. t . . . ' lllll~plf are ~o pnvilt>ged, a fortiori rt'ports pn•pari,
1 for hnn b~, (·=~1wrts art> not. Just as in thr lfl,k 
man case, howt>ver, tlw non-priviJpcrpd natt . 
th . f . . I"'.> lfp 01 e m ormat10n 1s not condusivp as to whrthi· 
or not discov('ry should be allowed." ' 
At page 1529, Moort> also statt>s : 
"It is clear .that .the pa~ty rngaging the rxiwn 
has no vested nght m ket>pmg secret any relPvant 
facts. The decision in Hickman i:. Taylor rnalil') 
it plain that 'mutual knowledge of all relernm 
facts gathered by both parties is Pssential to prn. 
per litigation' and the 'fishing expedition' objP(" 
tion is without validitv. Our analvsis of !hi' 
Hickman case has also ~ho\vn that the mere faet 
that one party may have gone to the expense to 
obtain statements of witnessPs and other inforrna. 
tion does not immunize such data from discovery. 
Examination of an expert \\·itness, however, is not 
the same as inspection of statements of ordinary 
lay \vitnesses to an accident." 
From the foregoing analysis of the law covering thi 
right of discovery of expert's opinions, it appears that 
under the uncontroverted and unexcepted to findings ot 
the trial court in this case, that the opinions of these 
experts are by their vt>ry nature not privileged com-
munications. Respondents have not rec1uested the produc· 
tion of the written statements nor have respondents 
attempted to interrogate the State as to what has gone 
into the formulation of these opinions, but merely the 
: 
1i.i 
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final oprn1011 ib-:Plf. R1·svonclents haw kept within the 
spirit of tli1· Hu!Ps CotmHittPe, who, in preparing the 
('lll'l'Pllt rPa<ling of l-tah rulP 30(h) and stated in their 
('O]lltllt'nb: 
"T1•sts sneh as wlwtlwr the examination con-
stitut<•s a 'fishing ex1wdition', 'penalizes the dili-
gPnt', 'pnts a Jll'Pmium on laziness', or is subject 
to a hrnad rnlP of privilege protecting all matter 
gatllf•rt>d or prepared by or for an attorney, are 
n•jPdP(l. A cliPnt\; privilege of free communica-
tion with his attorney is protected in that pro-
duction or inspection is not permitted as to any 
part of a u-riti11.r1 reflecting the attorney's legal 
tl1inking ... " 9, rCA, page 559 and 560. Com-
pilt>r's notes. (Emphasis added) 
In vie\\· of tlw foregoing, it appears that if appellant 
had desired a protPctive ordt>r and a hearing on the 
merits in thi:,; eaS(\ such a propt>r objection should have 
hePn raisPd within tht> tt'n days as prescribed by the 
rules. With the failure of appellant to so do, and the 
failnrP of ap1wllant to object to the findings of the court 
in support of its order, this court should accept said 
findings and uphold the decision of the lower court and 
rule in favor of rt>spondents herein. 
POINT II 
THE AWARD OF THE TRIAL COURT OF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES FOR BRINGING THE REMEDIAL MOTION UNDER 
RULE 37, UTAH RULES CIVIL PROCEDURE, WAS NOT 
ERRONEOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
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Under Rule 37, URrCP, it is within the discreti 
th t . 1 . on ol e na Judge to award attornev's fees for th · 
• ' e appPar 
ance of respondents' counsel to brin<r remedi.al 1 t' a no ion~ 
Without belaboring this point as the la"· on thi·s h' '· 
• • · ' SU .)PCT 
is. nearly non-ex1sknt, the court's attention should bP 
directed to the negligent acts of the State Attornry 
General's office in negligently or willfully failing fo 
adhere to the Rules of Civil Procedure. In 78-2-4 rc11 
' .1, 
1953, the Supreme Court of Utah is given the 
" t "b ... power o prescn e, alter and revis\•, bv 
rules, for all courts of the State of Utah ... th~ 
practice and procedure in all civil and criminal 
actions. . . . Such rules may not abridge, enlarge 
or modify the substantive rights of any litigant.'' 
Interestingly enough, in condemnation suits brought 
by the State on behalf of its Road Commission, parties 
defendant in this court's previous ruling in State Road 
Commission v. Parker, 13 Utah 2d 65, 368 P2d 585, and 
cases cited therein, the said State of Utah may not be 
made a party to any counterclaim because of the sover· 
eign immunity. It seems inconceivable, however, with 
the discretionary powers of this court having been vested 
in it by the legislature, and in view of the specific provi· 
sion in Rule 37 to provide for the payment of attorney's 
fees for the bringing of remedial motions, such as the 
subject matter of this appeal, that immunity could be 
rationalized to the point that the State of Utah, or any 
governmental body, could cloak itself behind the veil of 
"the State can do no wrong" and proceed to cause litiga· 
15 
tion and "'qJPn:-c· t(J tlw 1wople of this State without hav-
i nµ: to adh1·n· to the• :-arn<> rulP8 of practice and procedure 
a~ th<'." may n•quin• from th!:' litigants who did not invite 
tl11· c·ourt proceedings. 
Xo mw i:- di:-puting the right of the State to exercise 
in a lau.f11l manm•r the right of emin{'nt domain. On the 
(·ontrn1T, hnwPV{'l, it would seem to the writer of this 
hriPt that Equal Prot{'etion elause of the Constitution 
"11nl<l not onl~· ineludP a eonsideration of the Due Process 
elau~r in Prnin{'nt domain proceedings, but ·would also 
in('luclP t}w rights of defendants in eminent domain pro-
<·P<>ding·s to lw treat<>d l:'qually and fairly, the same as if 
tlw appPllant were an ordinary citizen suing in tort or 
!'ontrart. The rPasonahlent>ss of attorney's fees, of course, 
is disen•tionary, and abuse of this discretion is always 
"nhject to revi{'w h~· this court; but to rule that the de-
frndant is not Pntitled to an award of its attorney's fees 
\rnuld lw to allow the State of Utah if it, or its officers 
and agPnts so {'leeted in all cases of litigation to com-
plefrl~· ignorP tlw ru]ps of practice and procedure before 
tlw eourts of this State and leave their opponents with 
no rights to Pnforcc> court orders and litigate fairly under 
the adversary system we follow. 
CONCLUSION 
RespondPnts n•quest this court to uphold the ruling 
of the lnwt>r court in ordering the State of Utah to answer 
tlw intt>rrogatoriPs and to find that the same is not 
priYilrged information nor the work product of appel-
16 
lant's counsel, or in tht> alternative, that thei,;e ohjf'r·tio;: 
have been waived by the failurt> to ohjPet to ~aid inter 
rogatories within the ten days after S<TvieP a~ presrrihe!] 
by the rtah Rules of Civil Procedurt>. 
Respondents further reqrn~st this eourt to n11! 111 J1l 
the ruling of the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow awardi11., 
of attorney's foes for the failure of plaintiff to an~w~r 
dt>fendant's intc>rrogatories within the time imsr·ril11·~ 
by said rules. 
Rc>spectfully submitted, 
ROBERT 1\L McRAE 
Attorney for Respondents 
516 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, l'tah 
